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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION. 
At present the vast majority of individuals who can be described as ‘representative taxpayers’ 
in terms of section 153 of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (hereafter the TAA) are 
going about their day to day activities, blissfully unaware of the extent to which they are 
exposed to the risk of being held personally liable by the Commissioner of the South African 
Revenue Services (the Commissioner).  
 
 Lurking within the confines of the TAA is section 155 which confers the potential for 
personal liability and may have draconian1 consequences for representative taxpayers who 
are unaware of the provisions impact. Historically the TAA came into operation on 1 October 
2012 and consequently there is limited research on the topic. However this concept of 
personal liability of representative taxpayers has its origins in the section 1 of the Income Tax 
Act 58 of 1962 (hereafter the Income Tax Act), sections 48(6) and 48(9) of the Value-Added 
Tax Act 89 of 1991 (hereafter the VAT Act) and Paragraphs 16(2B) and 16(2C) of the Fourth 
Schedule to the Income Tax Act.  
 
At the heart of personal liability in tax cases is section 155 of the TAA which essentially 
states that a representative taxpayer can be held liable in his or her personal capacity for 
outstanding taxes owed by the taxpayer. The section reads as follows: 
 
 ‘Personal liability of representative taxpayer. — A representative taxpayer is  personally 
 liable for tax payable in the representative taxpayer’s representative    capacity, if, while it 
 remains unpaid—  
a) the representative taxpayer alienates, charges or disposes of amounts in 
respect of which the tax is chargeable; or  
 
b) the representative taxpayer disposes of or parts with funds or moneys, which 
are in the representative taxpayer’s possession or come to the representative 
                                                          
1 A Van Staden ‘Draconian understatement penalties and potential personal liability for liquidation and business 
rescue practitioners’ available at http://www.corprecover.co.za/wp/?p=58, accessed on 15 April 2015. 
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taxpayer after the tax is payable, if the tax could legally have been paid from 
or out of the funds or moneys.’ 
 
At present section 155 of the TAA empowers the Commissioner in certain 
circumstances to hold a representative taxpayer personally liable for the taxpayer’s 
outstanding tax debt. In terms of section 184 of the TAA the Commissioner must first request 
reasons from the representative taxpayer as to why they should not be held personally liable 
in terms of section 155 of the TAA. Thereafter there is no further requirement that the 
Commissioner is obliged to adhere to before invoking section 155 of the TAA and imposing 
personal liability. 
 
In this discussion I will submit that section 184 of the TAA as it reads at present is not 
sufficiently robust from a procedural fairness point of view as a preliminary step to invoke 
section 155 of the TAA. In light of the fact that section 155 of the TAA does not require 
judicial oversight before imputing personal liability there should be more stringent checks 
and balances imposed on the Commissioner under section 184 before the Commissioner can 
invoke section 155.  It is therefore suggested that section 155 of the TAA must include a 
generic process or enquiry that the Commissioner must adhere to before requesting reasons in 
terms of section 184 of the TAA. The enquiry that was conducted in Peretz, Leon Yehuda v 
Commissioner for South African Revenue Services2 is a good example of a suitable enquiry or 
process to be included in section 155 of the TAA. 
 
Furthermore the definition of a representative taxpayer in section 153 of the TAA 
read with section 1 of the Income Tax Act is wide enough to include ‘public officers, trustees, 
directors, members and shareholders of CC’s and companies.’3 In the case of employees tax 
                                                          
2 Peretz v Commissioner for South African Revenue Services (WLD) unreported case no 92/1236 of 23 June 
2006 at para 16 (In the Peretz case the commissioner had conducted an analysis of the bank statement versus the 
VAT returns and managed to sustain the contention that the CC had funds available in its bank account and the 
applicant who had been in controfl of the bank account had failed to make payment of taxes which were due.). 
3 E Bell ‘Beware: You can be held liable for a company’s tax debts’ available at 
http://www.thesait.org.za/news/170921/Beware-You-can-be-held-liable-for-a-companys-tax-debts.htm, accessed 
on 15 April 2015. 
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the following categories of persons may also qualify as representative taxpayers: ‘liquidators, 
judicial mangers, any manager, secretary or other responsible person.’4  
 
Many business owners are of the mistaken belief that they are protected by the 
separate legal personality of the business and they are unaware that they are in terms of the 
TAA and the Income Tax Act effectively representative taxpayer’s.5 Therefore they may not 
be in a position to seek legal protection against the risk of personal liability arising from their 
status as ‘representative taxpayers’.6  
 
Considering the wide range of persons that may be exposed to the risk of being held 
personally liable, and the turbulent economic environment that South African businesses 
operate within, it is quite conceivable that many representative taxpayers may eventually face 
the wrath of section 155 of the TAA.  
 
Given the relative infancy of this piece of legislation,7 the lack of research on this 
topic, there is a real need for a study that explains when and under which circumstances a 
representative taxpayer may be held personally liable for the taxpayer’s tax debt and the 
extent to which the representative taxpayer may be held liable in terms of section 155 of the 
TAA. Thus the purpose of this study is to analyse the meaning and effect of these provisions 
and to suggest improvements to section 155 of the TAA. 
 
 In chapter 2 I will analyse the meaning, purpose and practice at present of 
section 155 of the TAA. The chapter will conclude with a recommendation 
regarding whether 155 of the TAA should be developed further.   
                                                          
4 SARS ‘Interpretation note no. 27 - Personal liability of employers, representative employers, shareholders and 
directors for outstanding employees’ tax’ available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Notes/LAPD-IntR-IN-2012-27%20-
%20Personal%20Liability%20Employers%20Representative%20Employers%20Shareholders%20Directors.pdf
, accessed on 15 April 2015. 
5 Ibid note 3. 
6 Ibid note 3. 




 In chapter 3 I will analyse and define the meaning of the individual words and 
phrases in section 155 of the TAA in the context of relevant case laws. 
 
 In chapter 4 I will discuss and comment on the issue of whether section 155 of 
the TAA can still be applied when a business rescue or liquidation is in 
progress. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the application of section 
155 of the TAA in the case of a business rescue or liquidation. 
 
 In chapter 5 I will critically analyse whether section 155 of the TAA is 
analogous with the corporate law practice of piercing the corporate veil. This 
is necessary because section 155 of the TAA appears to bear the hallmarks of 
piercing the corporate veil in the sense that the Commissioner is looking 
behind the corporate veil and analysing the actions of the persons in control of 
the company or business. In concluding the chapter I will propose that certain 
styles of interpretation used in piercing the corporate veil may also be used 
when invoking section 155 of the TAA. 
 
 In chapter 6 I will highlight and discuss other issues that arise when section 
155 of the TAA is applied.  In considering these issues we can determine how 
section 155 of the TAA may be further developed. 
 
 In Chapter 7 I will propose a practical solution to facilitate the fair and 
equitable application of section 155 of the TAA. 
 
 In Chapter 8 I will conclude my study by recommending a solution to the 
problem that section 155 of the TAA in its present form presents. 
 
Ultimately the study will conclude with a determination on whether a generic process 
or enquiry is required to add more clarity to section 155 of the TAA and the basic tenets of an 
appropriate enquiry or process will be proposed which can be adhered to before personal 




CHAPTER 2:  THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL LIABILITY IN TAX CASES. 
In this chapter I will discuss the present application of section 155 of the TAA in practice. 
This will then set the stage for a brief discussion on whether section 155 of the TAA requires 
further development, and if so how can this be achieved. In order to make this determination I 
will briefly consider a few basic theories of taxation in order to explain the principles that 
underlie a sound fiscal system. This will then set the foundation for a discussion on whether 
section 155 of the TAA is inconsistent with a sound system of taxation. This will ultimately 
lead to a consideration of whether section 155 of the TAA should be developed further in 
order to enhance the South African fiscal system.  
   
2.1 The Practice at Present. 
At the outset it is important to remember that the liability for the tax debt is considered to rest 
with the taxpayer first.8 All the avenues to collect the outstanding tax debt from the taxpayer 
must be exhausted first. This point is highlighted by a recent article on the South African 
Institute of Chartered Accountants (hereafter SAICA) website.9 It is of paramount importance 
that ‘SARS point of departure must be that liability for the tax debt of a company, CC or trust 
rests with the legal entity in the first place.’10 Despite this directive, section 155 of the TAA 
makes it possible for the Commissioner to hold the representative taxpayer personally liable 
for the taxpayer’s tax debt under essentially two instances.11 The first being as a result of 
negligence, in the sense that funds were available and payment was not made.12 The second is 
criminal in nature, such as fraudulent activities like the dissipation of assets to avoid payment 
of tax.13  
 
                                                          
8 ‘Tax Administration 2080. Personal liability for tax debts’ available at 
https://www.saica.co.za/integritax/2012/2080._Personal_liability_for_tax_debts.htm, accessed on 05 April 2015 
(The article dealt with the experience of a representative taxpayer whom the Commissioner had sought to hold 
personally liable for the taxpayer’s tax debt in terms of section 155 of the TAA. The process had begun with a 
notice from the Commissioner seeking to hold the representative taxpayer personally liable for the debt of the 
taxpayer. The article states that certain words and phrases that are used in the letter ‘will probably scare many an 
addressee’. The fear and frenzy that this letter may cause is sufficient basis to set any representative taxpayer 
scrambling to know more about the risk that they are exposed to.). 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 P Dachs and C Rogers ‘Tax liability and recovery’ available at https://www.ensafrica.com/news/Tax-liability-





Once the Commissioner decides to hold the representative taxpayer personally liable 
he may the issue a Notice of Assessment to the representative taxpayer.14 The issuance of the 
assessment to the representative taxpayer will trigger the right to object or appeal against the 
assessment in terms of section 104 of the TAA.15 Should the Commissioner omit to issue a 
Notice of Assessment in terms of section 96 of the TAA then there can be no liability.16 This 
appears to be the escape hatch for a representative taxpayer that faces the wrath of section 155 of the 
TAA.17 However the Commissioner can in certain circumstances raise an assessment at any 
time.18 In practice the process of attributing personal liability in terms of section 155 of the 
TAA proceeds as follows: 
 
1. The Commissioner will issue a notice to the representative taxpayer requesting 
reasons as to why representative taxpayer should not be held personally liable 
for the taxpayer’s tax debt.19 The Commissioner is required to afford the 
representative taxpayer with an opportunity to make these representations in 
terms of section 184 of the TAA.20  
 
2. It is assumed that, depending on the nature of the representations made the 
Commissioner will then decide whether to proceed to hold the representative 
personally liable in terms of section 155 of the TAA.  
 
3. The Commissioner then has the prerogative to issue an assessment21 against 
the representative taxpayer in his personal capacity.  
                                                          
14 S Klue... et al ‘Representative Taxpayers’  in Silke on Tax Administration available on 
http://classic.mylexisnexis.co.za/nxt/gateway.dll/7b/52iib/gejib/4eujb?f=templates$fn=default.htm$vid=mylnb:1
0.1048/enu, accessed on 06 April 2015 (This assessment would be issued in terms of section 96 of the TAA and 
obviously relate to the taxes owed by the taxpayer.). 
15 Section 104 of the TAA provides that the taxpayer who is aggrieved by an assessment made in respect of the 
taxpayer may object to the assessment. Since an assessment has now been issued to the representative taxpayer 
in his personal capacity he can now object to the assessment if he so wishes. 
16  L Olivier ‘Constitutional review of SARS’s power to collect outstanding income tax’ 2010 De Jure available 
on http://classic.mylexisnexis.co.za/nxt/gateway.dll/2l4da/2gbfb/o8qob/nehsb/sehsb 
.pdf?f=templates$fn=default.htm$vid=mylnb:10.1048/enu, accessed on 06 April 2015.  
17 Ibid note 11 (Dachs accentuates the point that in terms of section 96 of the TAA the Commissioner must issue 
a Notice of Assessment before imputing liability and should the Commissioner fail to do so then there can be no 
liability.). 
18 In terms of section 99(2) of the TAA there is no moratorium against the Commissioner raising an assessment 
in cases where there is fraud, misrepresentation or non-disclosure of material facts.  
19 Ibid note 11. 
20 Section 184 of the TAA. 




4. Once the representative has been held personally liable the Commissioner may 
then initiate steps to recover the tax debt from the representative taxpayer in 
terms of section 184 of the TAA.  
 
It is clear from the above process that the TAA does not regulate a process that the 
Commissioner is obliged to administer before requesting the representative to make 
representations. Furthermore section 155 of the TAA does not mention that judicial sanction 
is a requirement to confer personal liability. These points raise the question of whether 
section 155 of the TAA needs further development. 
 
2.2 The Need for Development. 
When designing tax policy the legislative drafters are faced with a difficult and intricate 
process as tax law affects a plethora of individual needs and wants.22 Taxation has been a part 
of South African society since approximately 1600 and is regarded as ‘compulsory payments’ 
made to the government for general expenditure and benefit to society.23 According to 
Silke,24 tax laws are the ‘financial measures employed by the government to influence or 
intervene in the economy’. The principles underpinning the design of taxation policies are 
considered to have been influenced by Adam Smith25 who was of the view that a good fiscal 
system should contain the following principles:26   
 ‘The Equity Principle: Tax should be imposed according to one’s ability or capacity. 
 The Certainty Principle: The timing, amount and manner of tax payments should be 
certain. 
 The Convenience Principle: Taxes should be imposed in a manner or at a time that is 
convenient for taxpayers. 
 The Economic Efficiency Principle: Tax should be designed in a manner not unduly 
influencing economic decision-making. 
                                                          
22 E Bronkhorst & M Stiglingh Silke: South African Income Tax (2015) at page 1177. 
23 Ibid at page 1178. 
24 Ibid. 
25 A Smith The wealth of nations (1947) Vol 2: 307. 
26 Ibid note 22 at page 1187. 
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 The Administrative Efficiency Principle: The tax system should be designed in such a 
manner as to not impose an unreasonable administrative burden on the taxpayer and 
the Revenue Authorities. 
 The Flexibility Principle: A good tax system should be designed in such a manner that 
it can easily adjust in response to changing economic circumstances.’27  
 
 The aforementioned principles are commonly considered to be the hallmarks of a 
good fiscal system.28 Professor Haupt29 is of the view that these principles are still relevant 
today. As such I am of the view that any determination as to whether section 155 of the TAA 
is sound and defensible from a tax law perspective will have to consider whether section 155 
of the TAA meets the aforementioned requirements. The most glaring principle in conflict 
with section 155 of the TAA appears to be the equity principle, which according to Silke30 is 
rooted in the principle of fairness. The equity principle consists of vertical equity and 
horizontal equity.31 According to the principle of vertical equity a person with a greater 
‘economic capacity’ should pay more taxes than a person with a lesser capacity. In sync with 
this principle is the horizontal principle which in effect provides that two persons of equal 
‘economic capacity’ should pay the same amount of tax. When considering the effect of 
section 155 of the TAA it appears that the legislature may have ignored this principle in the 
sense that a representative taxpayer who is held personally liable for a taxpayer’s tax debt 
may be faced with paying more taxes than his economic capacity.  
 
 On the face of it there appears very little flexibility and equity enshrined in section 
155 of the TAA and it is not consistent with Adam Smith’s principle. Clegg32 is of the view 
that where a person is liable in terms of the tax provisions then the necessary taxation must be 
imposed despite that fact that Adam Smith’s ideals might not being adhered to.33 I do not 
agree with this line of thinking and believe that Adam Smith’s theory should prevail and that 
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax 34 ed (2015) 2. 
30 Ibid note 26. 
31 P Black, E Calitz & T Steenkamp Public Economics (2011) 10. 
32 D Clegg ‘Income Tax in South Africa’ available at http://www.mylexisnexis.co.za/Index.aspx, accessed on 01 
December 2015. 
33 Ibid.   
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the legislature should have given consideration to the implication of these principles when 
drafting section 155 of the TAA. In order to determine whether there is indeed a violation of 
Adam Smith’s equity principle it is necessary to examine more closely the legislature’s 
intention when drafting this section 155 of the TAA.  
 
The drafting of the TAA began in 2005 and the objective of Act was to provide 
simplicity and codify the various separate pieces of taxation legislation into one piece of 
legislation.34 According to the Draft Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Tax 
Administration Bill35 it was envisaged that ‘the potential personal liability of parties involved 
in the financial affairs of a company should serve as encouragement to comply with the tax 
laws by ensuring correct and timely payment of tax.’ This indicates the legislature’s intention 
of fostering a climate of compliance, and may well be the reason why the definition of 
representative taxpayers was drafted so as to have broad application. The Response 
Document to the Standing Committee on Finance36 requested that the TAA should include ‘a 
process for a responsible third party to be informed of any impending liabilities to ensure 
that prior notice is provided.’ However there is no clear process defined in the TAA that 
regulates this issue before liability is invoked. I am of the view that should an assessment be 
issued against the representative taxpayer in his personal capacity for the taxpayer’s tax 
liability, then the objection and appeal process37 may be used settle such issues. In chapter 9 
of the TAA we find section 104 which empowers a taxpayer to a lodge an objection where he 
or she is aggrieved by an assessment. Furthermore section 107 of the TAA allows the 
taxpayer to appeal against a decision made by the Commissioner on an objection.  
  
The objection and appeal process appears to regulate the process once an assessment 
is issued against the representative taxpayer, invoking these provisions would involve 
extensive time and effort from the representative taxpayer. The ‘pay now and argue later’ 
principle38 upon which the Commissioner administers its dispute resolution processes will no 
                                                          
34 ‘History of the Tax Administration Act, 2011’ available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/Legal/TaxAdmin/Pages/History.aspx, accessed on 29 June 2015. 
35 Draft Explanatory Memorandum on the Draft Tax Administration Bill, 2009. 
36 Response Document on the Tax Administration Bill 2011 to the Standing Committee on Finance.   
37 The objection and appeal process is contained in Chapter 9 of the TAA. 
38 South African Revenue Service Dispute Resolution Guide: Guide on the Rules Promulgated in terms of 
section 103 of the Tax Administration Act, 2011 28 October 2014.  
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doubt burden the representative taxpayer. There is some relief in the sense that the 
representative taxpayer will have the opportunity to apply for the suspension of payment in 
terms of section 164 of the TAA. It however seems quite daunting that the representative 
taxpayer will only enjoy the power of the objection and appeal process once an assessment 
has been raised and the issue of tax collection becomes relevant. Significantly where there is 
a serious risk that payment will not be made the Commissioner may impose a 24 hour period 
for payment as stated in the case of Singh v CSARS.39 In such instances the burden on a 
representative taxpayer and their ability to challenge the assessment is especially onerous.  
 
Therefore I am of the view that once an assessment has been raised against a 
representative taxpayer in his or her personal capacity for taxes owed by a taxpayer then, a 
request for reasons for the assessment should be made. In the recently decided SCA case of 
CSARS v Pretoria East Motors (Pty) Ltd40 it was decided that the Commissioner must 
provide reasons for raising an assessment.41 In the SARS Dispute Resolution Guide42 it is 
stated that the duty to provide reasons is limited due to the administrative burden it places on 
the Commissioner and such reasons may only be requested with regard to an ‘adverse 
decision or assessment both under rule 6 and section 5 of PAJA’. The reference in this quote 
to rule 6 is in regard to the rules that were promulgated under section 103 of the TAA. The 
reference to section 5 of PAJA refers to the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000. The guide also cautions that the taxpayer can request reasons via two avenues, but once 
adequate reasons have been provided the taxpayer cannot request reasons again.      
 
It is thus apparent that in order to avoid undue hardship for a representative taxpayer 
there should be a process in place, with stringent checks and balances imposed by the TAA 
on the Commissioner, obliging the Commissioner to determine personal liability. The 
Commissioner should be compelled to adhere to this process before requesting reasons from 
the representative taxpayer in terms of section 184 of the TAA as to why they should not be 
held liable in terms of section 155 of the TAA.   
                                                          
39 Singh v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service 2003 4 SA 520 (SCA) para 21. 
40 CSARS v Pretoria East Motors (Pty) Ltd 2014 (5) SA 231 (SCA). 
41 Ibid at  para 11.  




CHAPTER 3: DECONSTRUCTING AND DEFINING THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS. 
In this chapter I will deconstruct, define and critically analyse the essential elements and 
specific words, terms and phrases of section 155 of the TAA. The following words, terms and 
phrases have accordingly been selected from section 155 of the TAA: ‘representative 
taxpayer’, ‘tax payable’, ‘alienates’, ‘charges’, ‘disposes’ and ‘funds or moneys’.  At this 
juncture it is imperative to refer to the case of SIR v Kirsch43 and note the words of Coetzee J 
which aptly summarises the correct approach to interpreting the language used in statutes: 
‘There is no particular mystique about “tax law”. Ordinary legal concepts and terms are 
involved and the ordinary principles of interpretation of statutes fall to be applied. One must 
look fairly at the language used to determine the intention of the Legislature.’44 
 
3.1 Representative Taxpayers. 
 
3.1.1 Definition as per the TAA. 
Section 153 of the TAA defines the term ‘representative taxpayer’ and reads as follows: 
  
(1) In this Act, a representative taxpayer means a person who is responsible for paying 
  the tax liability of another person as an agent, other than as a withholding agent, and 
  includes a person who— 
 
  (a) is a representative taxpayer in terms of the Income Tax Act; 
  (b) is a representative employer in terms of the Fourth Schedule to the Income Tax 
      Act; or 
  (c) is a representative vendor in terms of section 46 of the Value-Added Tax Act. 
 
(2) Every person who becomes or ceases to be a representative taxpayer (except a public 
  officer of a  
company) under a tax Act, must notify SARS accordingly in such form as the 
Commissioner may prescribe, within 21 business days after becoming or ceasing to 
be a representative taxpayer, as the case may be.  
                                                          
43 Secretary for Inland Revenue v Kirsch 1978 (3) SA 93 (T). 




(3) A taxpayer is not relieved from any liability, responsibility or duty imposed under a 
  tax Act by reason of the fact that the taxpayer’s representative— 
 
 (a) failed to perform such responsibilities or duties; or 
 (b) is liable for the tax payable by the taxpayer.  
   
3.1.2 According to the Commissioner. 
On the SARS website under the Frequently Asked Questions (hereafter FAQ) page45 the 
following persons are identified as representative taxpayers: ‘Treasurer, Guardian, Curator, 
Public officer, Accountant, Tax Consultant, Attorney, Advocate, Legal Advisor, Auditor, 
Bookkeeper, Conveyancer in a case of Transfer Duty, Director, Employer, 
Executor/administrator, Fund Administrator, Insurance Broker, Relative/Parent, Secretary, 
Trustee, Etc.’ 
 
3.1.3 In the context of employees’ tax. 
SARS Interpretation Note 27 (‘IN 27’) which deals with the issue of personal liability of 
employers for employees’ tax,46 provides a guide to what is envisaged by the term 
‘representative taxpayer’ in respect of employees’ tax and not in respect of the TAA. In IN 
27 the term representative taxpayer is expanded to include liquidators, judicial mangers, any 
manager, secretary or other responsible person.47  
 
 IN 27 focuses primarily on the issue of ‘representative taxpayers’ in paragraph 5 (1) 
of the Fourth Schedule of the Income Tax Act, which provides that where an employer fails 
to withhold or deduct the full employees’ tax then the employer himself shall be held liable 
for this amount in his personal capacity. It is within these premises that I submit that the term 
representative taxpayer in the employees’ tax arena is defined widely in order to place 
                                                          
45 ‘FAQ’ available at http://www.sars.gov.za/FAQs/Pages/1186.aspx, accessed on 26 June 2015. 
46 ‘Interpretation note no. 27 - Personal liability of employers, representative employers, shareholders and 
directors for outstanding employees’ tax’ 
available at http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Notes/LAPD-IntR-IN-2012-27%20-
%20Personal%20Liability%20Employers%20Representative%20Employers%20Shareholders%20Directors.pdf




emphasis and foster compliance with paragraph 5 (1) of the Fourth Schedule of the Income 
Tax Act, and thereby to penalise a failure by the employer to deduct employees tax and 
ultimately aid with the tax collection process. In this respect this wider understanding of the 
term ‘representative taxpayer’ is not necessarily indicative of the position in terms of the 
TAA. 
 
3.1.4 In the context of VAT. 
The VAT Act has made specific provision for the definition of ‘representative taxpayers’ in 
section 48. In terms of section 48 (6) of the VAT Act a representative taxpayer can be held 
personally liable. At first glance it appears that this section mirrors section 155 of the TAA. 
However it is striking that section 48(6) of the VAT Act specifically includes the various 
forms of taxes in existence by using the words ‘any tax, additional tax, penalty or interest 
payable’. The careful drafting of the section ensures that there can be no confusion with such 
interpretation. I submit that section 155 of the TAA may benefit from harmonisation with 
section 48(6) of the VAT Act to this extent.  
 
 In terms of section 28 of the VAT Act every vendor is obliged to submit a return to 
the Commissioner which is a declaration made by the vendor himself for the calculation of 
tax. It is noted that VAT is a self-assessment tax therefore the Commissioner is not obliged to 
issue a notice of assessment, however where an additional assessment is raised by the 
Commissioner then a notice of assessment must be issued before imputing liability.48 In 
Singh’s case additional assessments were raised by the Commissioner however there was no 
notice of assessment that was issued to the vendor. 49 The court was of the view that since the 
Commissioner had raised an assessment a liability could not arise until such time as a notice 
of assessment had been issued.50     
 
3.2 The Meaning of the Word ‘alienates’. 
                                                          
48 R de Swart ‘Tax Administration’ in Silke: South African Income Tax (2015) 1135. 
49 Ibid note 39 at para 12. 
50 Ibid note 39 at para 22. 
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The terms alienate is not defined in the TAA therefore the definition in its plain and ordinary 
meaning as per the Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary51 will be referred to. The word is 
defined in the legal sense as meaning ‘Transfer ownership of (property rights) to another 
person or group’.  
  
3.3 The Meaning of the Word ‘charges’. 
I am of the view that on a literal interpretation the word charges appears to refer to a sale 
transaction where an amount of money is charged as price for goods or a service being sold. 
The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary52 defines the word charges in its verb form as a 
‘demand (an amount) as a price for a service rendered or goods supplied’.  
 
3.4 The Meaning of the Word ‘disposes’. 
The word ‘disposes’ had very eloquently been coined by Schreiner, J.A in CIR v Estate 
Kohler53 as ‘covering all acts in the law which affect property’. It is therefore imagined that 
section 155 implies a disposition in order to avoid or delay the payment of taxes.  
 
3.5 The Meaning of the Term ‘tax payable’. 
At the outset it is important to note that under Chapter 1 of the TAA in the definitions section 
the word tax is defined as ‘for purposes of administration under this Act, includes a tax, duty, 
levy, royalty, fee, contribution, penalty, interest and any other moneys imposed under a tax 
Act’.  This definition is clear and leaves little room for doubt. However the word payable 
adds the element of interpretation in the sense that one may ask the question when does a tax 
become payable. The obvious answer to this question is, rightly the date indicated on the 
notice of assessment. It appears that the answer becomes a bit more complex when the 
taxpayer is in liquidation proceedings or business rescue. Furthermore one also has to 
consider whether a tax is still payable by the representative taxpayer when a tax debt is 
                                                          
51 Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary available at 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/alienate, accessed on 26 June 2015. 
52 Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary available at 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/charge, accessed on 25 June 2015.   
53 CIR v Estate Kohler 18 SATC 354 at 373. 
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considered to irrecoverable at law in terms of section 198 of the TAA. These questions will 
be answered in chapter 4. 
 
3.6 The Meaning of the Words ‘funds or moneys’. 
It is interesting to note that section 155 of the TAA does not refer to assets but merely to 
‘funds or moneys’. On a literal interpretation this could mean that the section does not take 
into account assets which are received by the representative taxpayer and this could be a 
possible legal loophole for a representative taxpayer. The word ‘funds’ is defined in the 
Oxford Advanced Learner Dictionary54 as a ‘sum of money saved or made available for a 
particular purpose’ and ‘moneys’ is defined as a ‘current medium of exchange in the form of 
coins and banknotes; coins and banknotes collectively’.55 
 
3.7 The Meaning of the Word ‘possession’. 
The TAA does not define the word possession, however the Oxford Advanced Learner 
Dictionary56 defines the word as meaning ‘the state of having, owning, or controlling 
something’. 
  
3.8 Section 155(a) – ‘the commission of an act’. 
It appears that section 155(a) of the TAA is targeted at analysing the actions of the 
representative taxpayer and will be viewed with the emphasis being the commission of an act. 
 
3.9 Section 155(b) – ‘the omission of an act’. 
Conversely it appears that section 155(b) is targeted at analysing the acts of the representative 
taxpayer after an omission to pay tax, thus an omission of an act. It appears that this section 
                                                          
54 Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary available at  
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/fund, accessed on 30 June 2015. 
55 Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary available at   
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/money, accessed on 30 June 2015.  
56 Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary available at 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/possession, accessed on 29 June 2015. 
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actually requires that the representative taxpayer must have had the funds or moneys in his 
possession, or have had access to it, and omitted to pay the tax that was due and payable even 
though he was able to do so. 
 
The words ‘alienates’, ‘charges’, ‘disposes’ and ‘possession’ are some of the essential terms 
that have not been defined in the TAA. It is therefore quite conceivable that in disputes that 
involve the application of section 155 of the TAA there could be conflicting interpretations of 
these terms. These differences in interpretation may lead to unnecessary litigation. It is 
therefore submitted that the legislature should seek to define these words so to avoid any 
uncertainty. 
 
CHAPTER 4: PERSONAL LIABILITY OF REPRESENTATIVE TAXPAYERS IN 
BUSINESS RESCUES AND LIQUIDATIONS. 
In this chapter I will draw on the findings from my research and critically analyse whether a 
representative taxpayer can be held liable for outstanding taxes whilst the company is in the 
liquidation or business rescue process. The purpose of this exercise is to illustrate the 
operation of section 155 of the TAA in a real world setting and in doing so, highlight the 
problems that could be encountered in its application. 
 
 In company law once a liquidation order has been granted by a court or ‘a special 
resolution for the voluntary winding-up of a company has been registered’57 then in terms of 
section 359 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 no legal proceedings may be instituted against 
the company. The approach is mirrored in the case of a business rescue which is regulated by 
section 133 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (hereafter Companies Act 2008) and essentially 
provides that no legal proceedings may be instituted against the company that has been 
placed in business rescue.58 There are however a few exceptions to this legal bar on 
instituting legal proceedings, and one such exception pertains to the case of the representative 
taxpayer. Since the representative taxpayer is not in liquidation proceedings or in business 
rescue themselves, they are therefore exposed to the institution of potential legal proceedings. 
                                                          
57 Section 359 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
58 These exceptions are provided for in section 133 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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In terms of section 155 of the TAA it appears that there is no moratorium against personal 
liability being invoked against the representative taxpayer whilst the taxpayer is in the 
liquidation or business rescue process.59 Therefore it appears that ‘SARS will get its pound of 
flesh’60 and a representative taxpayer can be held liable for outstanding taxes whilst the 
taxpayer is in the liquidation or business rescue process.61  
 
4.1 In Liquidations. 
Professor Haupt62 is of the view that taxpayers are compelled to prove that an amount is not 
taxable in terms of section 102 of the TAA, however the Commissioner is only compelled to 
prove that an estimation penalty is correct and a section 95 estimated assessment is 
reasonable. One may well be deluded into thinking that the representative taxpayer will only 
bear the obligations of the taxpayer and none of the taxpayer’s rights. It is however a relief to 
note that in terms of section 181(4) of the TAA a person that would be liable for a company’s 
tax (in this case a representative taxpayer) is also able to exercise the rights that the company 
would have had available. It must however be noted with caution that this section only 
applies to companies that were voluntarily liquidated. With respect to companies that are 
involuntarily liquidated the law is not as clear, however the Public Officer who is considered 
to be the representative taxpayer of a company, will enjoy the same rights as the taxpayer in 
terms of section 248 of the TAA.  
 
 It thus appears that a representative taxpayer of an involuntarily liquidated company 
who is not the Public Officer of that company will only be subject to the taxpayer’s tax 
liabilities and not enjoy any rights of the taxpayer.  This appears to be an inequity in the law 
and this point has not been discussed in any of the legislature’s explanatory memoranda. I 
therefore consider this issue to be an unintended consequence by operation of the law and 
could also be viewed as a lacuna in the law. As such any person affected by this anomaly will 
need to approach the courts for further relief.  
                                                          
59 H Heymans ‘Are you the representative taxpayer at your business?’ available at 
http://fspbusiness.co.za/articles/accounting/are-you-the-representative-taxpayer-at-your-business-heres-what-
it-means-4905.html, accessed on 15 April 2015. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 




4.2 In Business Rescues. 
The process of business rescue is contained in Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 2008 and the 
purpose of business rescue is to ‘provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially 
distressed companies in a manner that balances the rights and interests of all relevant 
stakeholders.’63 In the case of CSARS v Beginsel NO and Others64 the court had to decide on 
the ranking of the Commissioner as creditor in a business rescue. The court held that in 
liquidations the Commissioner would be ranked as a preferent creditor and a concurrent 
creditor in a business rescue.65  
 
 It is thus apparent that despite the non-preferent nature of the Commissioner’s claim 
in a business rescue, the Commissioner will pursue a tax debt where it finds that the tax 
payable is recoverable. According to section 133 of the Companies Act 2008 a company in 
business rescue is protected by a general moratorium with specific exceptions against any 
legal proceedings. The point of interest at this juncture is whether a representative taxpayer is 
also protected by such a moratorium. The simple answer to this question that there appears to 
be no relief for the representative taxpayer in the TAA until such time as the tax debt is 
considered to irrecoverable at law in terms of section 198 of the TAA, or is written off in 
terms of section 199 of the TAA.  
 
 Despite the fact that the taxpayer is in liquidation proceedings or business rescue the 
representative taxpayer may remain liable. This is due to the cautionary nature of section 
198(2) of the TAA which provides that the tax debt will not be considered irrecoverable until 
such time as the Commissioner has pursued the assets of the person liable to tax which would 
include the representative taxpayer.  
 
                                                          
63 Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.  
64 Commissioner for South African Revenue Service v Beginsel NO and Others 75 SATC 87. 
65 Ibid at page 97. 
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It is interesting to note that it is possible that the business rescue practitioner and 
liquidator may well be argued to fall within the definition of a representative taxpayer. This is 
yet to be seen but it is certain that the Commissioner will get his pound of flesh.66 
 
CHAPTER 5: IS SECTION 155 OF THE TAA ANALOGOUS WITH PIERCING THE  
CORPORATE VEIL?  
In this chapter I will compare the concept and theory of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ which is 
found in company law with the concept of attributing personal liability to a representative 
taxpayer. At the outset this will entail a brief outline of the principles of piercing the 
corporate veil which will then form the basis of raising important issues that can be 
applicable to section 155 of the TAA. This will be achieved by an analysis of the manner in 
which our courts view the concept of personal liability in tax cases. In order to do this I will 
critically analyse a series of cases such as: Ochberg v Commissioner for Inland Revenue,67 
Dithaba Platinum(Pty) Ltd v Erconoraal Ltd & Another68 and Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner 
Controlling Investment(Pty) Ltd.69 The study will then determine whether the concept of 
piercing the corporate veil is analogous to the spirit, ambit and meaning of section 155 of the 
TAA. This is necessary because section 155 of the TAA appears to bear the hallmarks of 
piercing the corporate veil in the sense that we are looking behind the corporate veil and 
analysing the actions of the persons in control of the company or business. The result of this 
exercise will lead us to important considerations that could be applicable to section 155 of the 
TAA.  
  
5.1 The Approach of South African Courts to the Concept of Separate Legal Personality. 
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was confirmed70 in the case of Salomon v Salomon 
and Co Ltd.71 It was noted in this case that a veil was placed over a company of which courts 
                                                          
66 Ibid note 59.  
67 Ochberg v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1931 AD 215. 
68 Dithaba Platinum(Pty) Ltd v Erconoraal Ltd & Another 1985(4) SA 615(T). 
69 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investment(Pty) Ltd 1993(2) SA 784(C). 
70 Income Tax Case No 1611 59 SATC 126.  
71 Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd 1897 AC 22. 
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could not see through.72 The court was of the view that courts can ‘pull off the mask’ and look 
behind the veil to analyse what really is going on and that a company is a puppet of those that 
control it.73  
 
 In the case of Cape Pacific74 the court was tasked with the request of piercing the 
corporate veil. It was pointed out that in the general course of things a company has a 
‘separate legal identity’ and that ‘corporate obligations is the responsibility of the company 
and not that of shareholders, directors or officers who own and/or act for the entity’. The 
court described the concept of piercing the corporate veil as a process whereby the court 
disregards the separation between the company and those who control it. The court referred 
to the case of Dithaba Platinum75 and pointed out that South African courts very rarely pierce 
the corporate veil. In the case of ITC 161176 the court pointed out that there is ‘no self-
standing doctrine of piercing the veil’ and that the corporate veil cannot be lifted by a court 
only because it finds that it is just to do so. ITC 1611 further states that the veil can only be 
lifted in very specific circumstances and ‘only if that is legitimate by the application of 
established doctrines, such as the plus valet rule or the in fraudem legis rule (or in other 
cases of fraud or dishonesty) or, possibly, the actio pauliana’.77   
 
Section 155 of the TAA requires a careful consideration of the factors and events that 
took place behind the corporate veil. In Ochberg’s78 case the court had to apply a similar 
process of looking behind the corporate veil and analysing the facts that occurred.  The 
judgment has been referred to by the Appellate Division in cases such as Delfos v CIR79and 
CIR v People's Stores80 with approval.81 This case is a classic example of the difficulties and 
complexities that come into play when analysing the facts and events behind the corporate 
veil. A single set of facts could be interpreted in multiple dimensions which may result in 
                                                          
72 Ibid at page 30. 
73 Ibid at page 31.  
74 Ibid note 69 at  page 785. 
75 Ibid note 68. 
76 Ibid note 70 at page 141. 
77 According to ITC 1611 the in fraudem legis rule essentially consists of situations where the parties to an 
agreement attempt to hide a transaction that is prohibited or subject to tax and make it appear to be legal.   
78 Ochberg v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1931 AD 215. 
79 Delfos v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1933 AD 242. 
80 Commissioner For Inland Revenue v People's Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd [1990] 4 All SA 594 (AD). 
81 RC Williams Income Tax in South Africa - Cases and Materials 3 ed (2009) 104. 
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differing legal conclusions. In this case five judges of the Appellate Division had four 
differing views on the application of the law to the facts when looking behind the corporate 
veil. They also did not agree on the weight or importance that should be apportioned to 
certain factors. In order to truly grasp the complexities at play when analysing the facts 
behind the corporate veil it will be prudent to briefly analyse Ochberg’s case. This will help 
us understand importance of regulating a process before section 155 of the TAA can be 
invoked. In what will follow I have highlighted the essential elements of the case and the 
views highlighted by the four of the five judges that had handed down judgment in this case. 
This is as Curlewis JA concurred with Roos JA’s judgment and did not give separate reasons 
for so doing.  
 
A brief description of the facts of the case is as follows: at the commencement of the 
year of assessment, the Airton Timber Company Limited had a nominal capital of £5,107.  
The Appellant (Mr. Isaac Ochberg) held £5,107 worth of £1 shares and six others held one £1 
share each. The Appellant received from the Airton Timber Company Ltd during the year of 
assessment £4,893 worth of £1 shares for services rendered such as the financing of the 
Company by the Appellants, goodwill and the cession of a lease. The Appellant was of the 
view that since he had already been in full control of the company he did not receive value 
that he did not already have and therefore the value of the shares issued to him should not be 
subject to tax. The court was essentially faced with the task of looking behind the corporate 
veil and analysing the substance of the transaction. As the five judges of the court had four 
different views on the case each judgment has been highlighted to show the differences in 
interpretation. 
 
In Roos JA’s majority judgment which Curlewis JA concurred with, he looked behind 
the corporate veil to determine the true nature of the transaction. Roos JA considered the 
substance of the transaction and the taxpayer’s intention at the time of entering into the 
transaction. I am of the view that Roos JA maintained a common sense and realistic approach 
to analysing the substance of the transaction. This is evident when Roos JA considered a 
scenario where another person had taken the taxpayers place in the transaction and received 
the shares.  The Judge pointed out that if the shares had been issued to a person other than the 
taxpayer then that person would have been liable for tax on the value of those shares. He also 
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highlighted that if this thought process is correct then it does not make sense that the taxpayer 
should avoid liability for tax on the receipt of the shares. Furthermore the taxpayer’s 
shareholding would have been reduced if the shares had been issued to another person. 
Therefore the value of the shares being issued to the taxpayer was that his shareholding did 
not decrease. This common sense approach of analysing the facts had led the court to making 
the correct decision as confirmed in the Delfos82 case with approval.83 
 
Although De Villiers CJ concurred with Roos JA he did so for the following reasons: 
De Villiers CJ could not understand how, what is income if received by ‘A’ for services 
rendered can be said to have changed its nature into capital when received by ‘B’ equally for 
services rendered. The fact that the Appellant incurred losses by the acquisition of the shares 
does not change or convert what is received by an outsider as income into capital when 
received by him. De Villiers CJ was of the view that the court must look at the substance of a 
transaction and not whether or not the taxpayer has benefited thereby. 
 
In Statford, JA’s dissenting judgment he agreed that the Appellant had not benefited 
by the issue of shares to him. This Judge was of the view that the substance of the whole 
transaction must be looked at and not the methods used to carry it out. He accepted the 
relative and not the abstract measure of value and thus the Appellant’s receipt of the new 
shares did not alter his share in the assets. He looked at the simple analogy that ‘What is 
taken in the right hand is simultaneously and automatically surrendered by the left’. This led 
him to find that the accrual was of a capital nature since it was only obtained by a 
corresponding diminution of capital previously possessed. Stratford JA’s judgment was 
focused on looking at the transaction in its entirety and its actual effect on the taxpayer. 
 
In Wessels J.A’s dissenting Judgment he agreed with Stratford JA’s reasons and 
conclusion. However he found that juggling of shares of a private company is a favourite 
method of tax evasion. On these bases he emphatically stated that we must not merely look at 
the form of the transaction but at its real nature. We must therefore take all the facts into 
                                                          




consideration and judge from all the facts whether the amount is gross income. If the 
Appellant’s estate has not been increased then how could it be said to have received any 
amount or accrued anything to his estate. The legislature never intended that the State should 
take away a portion of a man’s capital where he seems to have received an amount of money 
but when in fact he has received no money and no money’s value. Although Wessels JA’s 
judgment was a dissenting judgment I agree with his rationale on the basis that he was able to 
provide a judgment which was reflective of the real world. Wessels JA’s judgment provides a 
good example of looking behind the corporate veil with a pragmatic approach. 
 
This exercise of highlighting the four different judgments shows us that the process of 
analysing the facts behind the corporate veil is complex and can have multiple facets. In 
Ochberg’s case four of the five judges handed down different reasons for their judgments. 
With the exception of Roos JA and Curlewis JA, who had agreed with each other on all 
aspects, the remaining three judges had differing views on how the transaction should be 
viewed. This is alarming in the sense that we are awakened to the subjective element of 
analysing facts behind the corporate veil. Considering the fact that section 155 of the TAA 
may be invoked without judicial oversight there should be more stringent checks and 
balances to be put into place before section 155 of the TAA may be invoked. This could 
entail a legislative intervention to ensure that only a court of law may confer personal liability 
in terms of section 155 of the TAA or that a generic process is proposed to ensure that all of 
the relevant facts are adequately and objectively viewed.  
 
5.2 The Courts will look at the Substance of the Transaction. 
In piercing the corporate veil the courts will look closely at the substance of the transaction 
that allowed for the disposition of the asset, in order to determine the overall intention of the 
parties. Similarly in section 155 of the TAA the transaction that renders the representative 
incapable of paying the tax due must be considered closely to determine liability. Therefore 
an example of how courts look at the substance of a transaction in piercing the corporate veil 





In the 2003 case of CSARS v Ben Nevis Holdings Ltd and Others84 the Transvaal 
Provincial Division was tasked with piercing the corporate veil, and as such had to look at the 
substance of a transaction opposed to its form. In this case the respondents had attempted to 
disguise a disposition to resemble a sale in order to avoid the application of a preservation 
order. It was common cause that the Commissioner had sought to pierce the corporate veil 
against the respondents in order to collect outstanding taxes owed by the taxpayer who was 
the sixth respondent. The court found that the respondents had entered into a sale agreement 
which the court viewed as an elaborate scheme to avoid the imposition of a preservation 
order. The court looked at the substance of the transaction and found that the sale was not 
bona fide, but an artificial transaction and in fraudem legis. In effect respondents had entered 
into an elaborate scheme which caused an aircraft it owned worth approximately two hundred 
million rands, to be sold and moved to Switzerland thus taking the asset out of the reach of 
the Commissioner. The court found that the respondent’s behaviour was tantamount to 
contempt as the preservation order had interdicted them from alienating any assets, and the 
false sale was accordingly reversed.  
 
The principles highlighted in the Ben Nevis case show us that the actual effect of a 
transaction should be looked at closely as opposed to the form of the transaction. The manner 
in which the court looked at the substance of the transaction and ultimately made a finding is 
a good example of the steps that should be taken before liability is imputed to a representative 
taxpayer. These principles are relevant to our discussion as section 155 of the TAA requires a 
consideration of the transaction that renders the representative incapable of paying the tax 
debt. It is imagined that a representative taxpayer with dubious intent may try to disguise a 
transaction to avoid the implementation of section 155 of the TAA. However if the approach 
of the court in Ben Nevis is applied then this loophole may easily be overcome. The substance 
of the transaction, as opposed to the form of the transaction, will be looked at and any 
transaction that actually falls within the confines of section 155 of the TAA will be identified. 
 
5.3 Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Statutes – Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008. 
                                                          




The Companies Act 2008 is of great significance to the process of determining the personal 
liability of representative taxpayers in the sense that section 20(9) provides a court with the 
statutory opportunity to pierce the corporate veil. Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 
provides that:   
 
If, on application by an interested person or in any proceedings in which a company is 
involved, a court finds that the incorporation of the company, any use of the company, or 
any act by or on behalf of the company, constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the 
juristic personality of the company as a separate entity, the court may –  
 
a) declare that the company is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of any 
 right, obligation or liability of the company or of a shareholder of the company or, in 
 the case of a non-profit company, a member of the company, or of another person 
 specified in the declaration; and 
 
b) make any further order the court considers appropriate to give effect to a declaration 
 contemplated in paragraph (a). 
 
 Section 20 (9) of the Companies Act 2008 essentially provides that liability would 
arise in the case where there is ‘an unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the 
company as a separate entity’. This would usually occur in instances of reckless trading or 
fraud.85 In Ebrahim v Airports Cold Storage86 the court described the nature of reckless 
trading as ‘an entire failure to give consideration to the consequences of one’s actions, in 
other words, an attitude of reckless disregard of such consequences’.  
 
 The first decided case87 dealing with this section of the Companies Act 2008 was the 
case of Ex parte Gore NO and Others NNO88 where the Western Cape High Court was faced 
                                                          
85 R Cassim ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil ‘Unconscionable Abuse’ under the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ August 
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with the issue of piercing the corporate veil in terms of section 20(9) of the Companies Act 
2008. The applicants had instituted the matter in terms of the common law rules, or otherwise 
in terms of section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008. The applicants in this case were the 
liquidators of forty one companies which were held by King Financial Holdings (‘KFH’). 
The King brothers were the directors and owned the majority of the shares in KFH and some 
of its subsidiaries.  Their core business was in the financial services industry and they had 
been marketing investments of immoveable properties.  
 
 The nature and magnitude of their business dealings had caught the attention of the 
Financial Services Board (‘FSB’) and ultimately resulted in the FSB conducting an 
investigation into their businesses. The FSB had found that the King brothers ran their 
businesses in such a manner that all the subsidiary companies were operated as one entity. 
They did not maintain any proper accounting records and the monies that were received from 
investors were transferred between the subsidiary companies with no legal or accounting 
purpose, merely at the whim of those controlling the business. They had scant regard to the 
separate legal personality and identity of each of the entities.  The manner in which these 
subsidiary companies were managed and operated appeared as if they had been operated as 
one company.  
 
 The poor administration of the investments resulted in the liquidators having great 
difficulty in identifying were the investor’s monies had actually been invested. In some cases 
the investors had received documents which evidenced an investment in property ‘A’ but in 
reality the money had actually been invested in ‘B’. It appeared that the management of KFH 
had allocated the investor’s moneys for their own benefit which was basically into a company 
within the group that was in need of funds or utilised for paying out investors who wished to 
withdraw their investments. Furthermore it was also reported that it was by luck that an 
investor’s money had been invested into a stable company and that those investors that were 
close to the King brothers were allocated preferential investments. Some of the most 
appalling acts were that that in certain circumstances share certificates had been issued to 
investors and no record of same had been kept by the company and that shares in KFH had 
been sold to the public although the company was registered as a private company. In view of 
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the glaring inconsistences and scant regard for the separate legal personalities of the 
companies, the court found that the group was in fact a sham. 
 
 The court found that when piercing the corporate veil the goal to be achieved is ‘a 
facts-based determination by the courts’89 to disregard the separate legal personality of the 
company in a manner that the law would not allow in the ordinary course.   
 
 The court was of the view that the words ‘unconscionable abuse of the juristic 
personality of a company’90 was wide enough to cover a wider variety of acts. The section 
afforded relief to a third party in circumstances were the separate personality of a company 
was used to achieve an illegitimate result which should not be allowed. Accordingly the court 
found that the piercing of the corporate veil in terms of section 20(9) could be invoked in 
cases were circumstances justified the application of section 20(9).  
 
 Bearing in mind that the court found that the words ‘unconscionable abuse of the 
juristic personality of a company’ was wide enough to cover a wider variety of acts it may be 
prudent to add the these words into section 155 (a) and (b) of the TAA. It will cater for 
situations were the words, ‘alienates’, ‘charges’, ‘disposes’ and ‘possession’ are inadequate 
to describe the omission or commission of an act. This addition will provide the escape hatch 
to the Commissioner in a case were a transaction is structured in a way to avoid falling within 
the confines of these words. 
 
5.4 Is Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 Analogous with Section 155 of the TAA? 
I submit that section 155 of the TAA has striking resemblance to that of section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act 2008 in the sense that the basic requirement appears to be the abuse of a 
juristic personality. Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 is limited to situations 
involving the abuse of a juristic personality however section 155 of the TAA does not require 
this. In a case where there is a juristic person involved in an application of section 155 of the 
                                                          
89 Ibid at page 441. 
90 Ibid at page 453. 
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TAA an abuse as described in section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 is not required. In 
this sense section 155 of the TAA covers a broader range of acts than section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act 2008. As such section 155 of the TAA and section 20(9) of the Companies 
Act 2008 are not analogous. 
  
Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 requires the deliberation of a court of law 
however section 155 of the TAA does not require a court of law to sanction personal liability 
before it is imposed by the Commissioner. It appears that the provisions of section 155 of the 
TAA are more aligned to the policies of fiscal administration. This is evident through the 
objective of the TAA being simplicity of tax administration.91 Furthermore section 155 of the 
TAA is contained under Chapter 10 which contains the Commissioner’s accelerated powers 
of collection. It not yet clear whether a court of law would agree with the application of 
section 155 of the TAA, however one thing remains certain, section 155 of the TAA will 
benefit fiscal administration in cases where tax evasion and fraud is evident. In this sense 
there is no common ground between section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 and section 
155 of the TAA.  
   
I submit that the two main differences between section 155 of the TAA and section 
20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 are as follows: Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 is 
limited to the abuse of a juristic personality whereas section 155 of the TAA covers a broader 
range of acts. Secondly section 155 of the TAA does not require judicial sanction whereas 
this is a requirement in section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008. Bearing the aforementioned 
in mind I find that section 155 of the TAA is not analogous to section 20(9) of the Companies 
Act 2008 although they may seem similar at first glance. 
 
CHAPTER 6: OTHER ISSUES THAT ARISE IN PRACTICE. 
In this chapter I will highlight and discuss other issues that arise when section 155 of the 
TAA is applied in a real-world setting. Each issue that is highlighted will be discussed with 
the aim of identifying deficiencies that may exist in the law as it stands. It is submitted that in 
                                                          
91 Ibid note 38. 
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considering and dealing with these issues the foundations of the ways in which section 155 of 
the TAA can be improved will be laid.  
 
6.1 The Legislature’s Quick Fix to Section 184 of the TAA. 
Section 184 of the TAA is the provision that enables the Commissioner to recover tax debts 
from a person that has been held personally liable in terms of section 155 of the TAA. In 
section 184 of the TAA, the Commissioner is empowered with the same right of recovery 
against a representative taxpayer as he has against the taxpayer. However this section was 
amended by section 51 of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act No. 44 of 2014 
which was promulgated on 20 January 2015 and reads as follows: (it must be noted that the 
words in brackets were substituted by the underlined words) 
 
 ‘Substitution of section 184 of Act 28 of 2011 
 51. (1) The following section is hereby substituted for section 184 of the Tax 
Administration Act, 2011: 
 
‘‘Recovery of tax debts from [responsible third parties] other persons 
 
184. (1) SARS has the same powers of recovery against the assets of a 
person [referred to in] who is personally liable under section 155, 157 or this 
Part as SARS has against the assets of the taxpayer and the person has the 
same rights and remedies as the taxpayer has against such powers of 
recovery. 
       (2) SARS must provide a [responsible third party] person referred to in 
subsection (1) with an opportunity to make representations— 
 
(a) before the [responsible third party] person is held liable for the    
tax debt of the taxpayer in terms of section 155, 157, 179, 180, 181, 182 
or 183, if this will not place the collection of tax in jeopardy; or 
 
(b) as soon as practical after the [responsible third party] person is 
held liable for the tax debt of the taxpayer in terms of section 155, 157, 
179, 180, 181, 182 or 183.’’. 
 




It is interesting to note that section 51 of the Tax Administration Laws Amendment92  
effectively changed the name of the section from ‘Recovery of tax debts from responsible 
third parties’ to ‘Recovery of tax debts from other persons’. I am of the view that this 
indicates the legislature’s intention to cast the net of personal liability to representative 
taxpayers even wider. This is further reiterated by the substitution of the words ‘responsible 
third party’ with the word ‘person’.  
 
In essence section 184 of the TAA requires the Commissioner to give the 
representative taxpayer an opportunity to make representations before imputing personal 
liability to them. According to the Draft Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill 2014, the 
object of amending section 184 of the TAA was to include the section 155 and 157 processes 
within the confines of section 184, as it was not included previously due an oversight. The 
rationale behind this view was that where a person was held liable in their personal capacity 
in terms of either section 155, 157 or 179 of the TAA it could not have been said that the 
person had a tax liability. Therefore if there was no tax liability there could have been no 
basis to issue an assessment against such person. It is within these premises that the TAA did 
not provide a process for collection of taxes from persons liable in terms of section 155, 157 
and 179 of the TAA.93  
 
This effectively means that with the amendment of section 184 of the TAA, the 
Commissioner may now recover outstanding taxes from representative taxpayers who are 
held liable in their personal capacity.94 It was further noted that prior to the amendment the 
Commissioner could only recover the outstanding taxes using a normal civil action and could 
not use its accelerated powers of collection as provided for in sections 169 to sections 186 of 
the TAA for persons appointed as third parties in section 179 of the TAA and held liable for 
tax in section 155, 157 or 179 of the TAA.95  
 
                                                          
92 Tax Administration Laws Amendment Act No. 44 of 2014. 
93 Draft Tax Administration Laws Amendment Bill 2014. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid . 
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Although it is evident that the lacuna has been addressed, I am of the view that there 
is still some uncertainty in this provision to the extent that section 184(2)(b) uses the words 
‘as soon as practical’. These words render the time period discretionary in nature and may 
cause unnecessary litigation in cases were the taxpayer does not accept the Commissioner’s 
interpretation of what is a practical time period. This uncertainty may also result in the Tax 
Ombuds office and the SARS Service Monitoring office being burdened with high volumes 
of complaints and enquiries by persons affected who would like to know when their matter 
would be resolved. 
 
6.2 Preservation of Funds. 
I am of the view that section 155 of the TAA places an indirect obligation on representative 
taxpayers to preserve funds. This is apparent in words ‘amounts’, ‘funds’ or ‘moneys’ in 
section 155 (a) and (b) of the TAA.  A failure to preserve these funds could lead to the 
representative taxpayer being held personally liable for the outstanding taxes. This 
interpretation is in accordance with section 22 of the Companies Act 2008. The provision 
states that ‘a company must not carry on its business recklessly, with gross negligence, with 
intent to defraud any person or for any fraudulent purpose.’96  It is therefore mandatory that a 
company does not carry on its business with gross negligence.  
 
I am of the view that a failure to preserve funds to pay taxes owing can be argued to 
be gross negligence. However Grové97 has found that directors are not expected to preserve 
funds such as a trustee would be expected to do, and has pointed to the findings of the court 
in Daniels t/as Deloitte Haskins & Sells v AWA Ltd.98 The court in that case was of the view 
that a trustee should exercise conservatism when making investments, however a director 
would not be expected to exercise such restraint and may accept commercial risks to yield a 
profit.   
 
                                                          
96 Section 22 of the Companies Act 2008.  
97 AP Grové Company Directors: Fiduciary Duties and the Duty of Care and Skill (unpublished LLM thesis, 
University of Pretoria 2012) 7. 
98 Daniels t/as Deloitte Haskins & Sells v AWA Ltd 191(1995) 37 NSWLR 438. 
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There is some relief to certain representative taxpayers who find that a director is 
acting negligently. In terms of section 162(5) of the Companies Act 2008 certain 
representative taxpayers may have the power to apply to court to have a director declared 
delinquent and accordingly mitigate the risk of taxes not being paid. The categories of 
persons who may do so are ‘a company, a registered trade union that represents employees 
of a company or another employee representative, the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission (CIPC) and the Takeover Regulation Panel.’99 Thus it is apparent that there are 
steps that the representative taxpayer can take mitigate the possibility of personal liability. 
 
6.3 The Nature of the Representative Taxpayer and Taxpayer Relationship is an Important 
      Factor to be Considered in Determining Personal Liability. 
It is submitted that the nature of the representative taxpayer and taxpayer relationship can be 
equated to that of an agent and principal relationship. This is apparent in the representative 
nature of the relationship. Classen100 has pointed out that the nature of secret or undisclosed 
profits received by an agent without the principal’s knowledge had been highlighted in the 
case of ITC 1792.101 Classen102 has further pointed out that in the case of ITC 1792103 the 
court was of the view that the funds remained taxable in the hands of the principal, as the 
agent’s actions were performed whilst executing his duties as the agent.  
 
 Classen104 is of the view that the mere fact that the agent had changed his intention 
and taken the funds into his own use is a factor that must be considered for practical reasons 
when dealing with normal tax. Classen105 is also of the view that a relationship similar to that 
of agency existed between the accused and the investors in MP Finance Group CC (In 
Liquidation) v CSARS.106 The court was faced with the scenario wherein the taxpayer had 
received funds in an illegal manner. The taxpayer had lured unsuspecting investors into 
                                                          
99 R Cassim ‘Delinquent directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ February 2013 De Rebus 26. 
100 LG Classen ‘Legality and Income Tax – Is SARS “entitled to” Levy Income Tax on Illegal Amounts 
‘received by’ a Taxpayer?’ (2007) 19 SA Merc LJ 537. 
101 Income Tax Case 1792 68 SATC 236.  
102 Ibid note 100 at 538. 
103 Ibid note 101 at para 241A. 
104 Ibid note 100 at page 548. 
105 Ibid note 100 at page 547. 
106 MP Finance Group CC (In Liquidation) v Commissioner for South African Revenue Services 69 SATC 141.  
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investing in a ponzi or pyramid scheme, of which the taxpayers knew, was unsustainable. It 
was found that although the funds were actually repayable immediately after receiving same 
and they still constituted receipts in the hands of the taxpayer of which was taxable. I am of 
the view and agree with Classen that this case can be viewed as an illegal agent scenario. The 
principles laid down in the MP Finance107 case can also be applied to the issue at hand. I am 
of view that where a representative taxpayer has misappropriated funds of the taxpayer he can 
justifiably be held personally liable for the taxpayers’ tax debt. This would not be an 
inequitable result as the misappropriated funds can also be argued to be taxable in the 
representative’s hands. 
 
 Section 155(b) envisages a situation whereby funds or moneys are in the possession 
of, or come to the representative taxpayer which could have been legally used to pay the tax 
debt owed by the taxpayer. It appears that the section does not differentiate between a case 
whereby the representative taxpayer kept the funds or moneys in a separate trust account or 
kept it in his own account for his own use and enjoyment. It also does not differentiate 
between situations where the representative taxpayer dealt with the funds in a legal or illegal 
manner. Thus if the funds were used by the representative taxpayer in an illegal manner it 
would lend more weight to the Commissioner’s case and satisfy the requirement set out in 
section 155(b) that funds or were available to pay tax. 
 
6.4 Compromising Trade Secrets. 
It is submitted that there is possibility that the enquiry envisaged in section 184 of the TAA, 
which requires a representative to make representations in order to absolve themselves of 
liability, could compromise a company’s trade secrets and thereby compromise its 
competitive edge. This would obviously depend on whether such information falls into the 
wrong hands. Should there be an element of unlawfulness or illegality in the company’s 
trading then the provision would not be detrimental. However where such does not exist then 
the Commissioner could possibly face a delictual claim for loss of income resulting from the 
trade secrets being revealed. It is comforting to note that the legislature has included 




safeguards against this in sections 67 - 74 of the TAA, which comprises Chapter 7, and is 
aptly named ‘Confidentiality of Information’. Furthermore in the Commissioner’s guide on 
access to information108 it is clear that there are sufficient checks and balances that are in 
place to avoid taxpayer information falling into the wrong hands. To this extent the 
Commissioner has actually appointed information officers whose sole task is administer 
requests for information held by the Commissioner. However considering the secrecy 
provisions contained in the TAA, and the Commissioner’s commitment to safeguarding 
taxpayer information, it seems unlikely that such a problem could eventuate.    
 
6.5 Anonymous Tip-Offs and Whistleblowing. 
I submit that the application of a whistle blowing program in South Africa may be great value 
to fiscal administration and could relieve representative taxpayers of some liability. WE 
Taggart109 highlights the reward nature of whistle-blowing administered in the United States 
of America by the Whistle-blower Office and the IRS informant awards program which 
allows for an award of between 15 to 30 percent of the taxes collected. The article cautions 
that the whistle-blower could be denied an award in circumstances where the whistle-blower 
was actually involved in the planning and initiation of the activities that led to the 
underpayment of the taxes, or that led to the tax evasion. Furthermore should the whistle-
blower be convicted of a criminal offence then the whistle-blower would not be entitled to 
any award whatsoever. Should the whistle-blower not be involved in the tax evasion then 
they would be entitled to award based on the relevance of the information provided and the 
degree to which the IRS used the information. The identity of the whistle-blower is protected 
while assisting with the investigation, and given an opportunity to provide a meaningful 
contribution. The information on the amount collected will be shared with whistle-blower 
which will ultimately determine the award to be received. Should the whistle-blower not 
agree with the amount of the award then the whistle-blower has a right of appeal to the Tax 
Court. 
                                                          
108 ‘Service Manual On The Promotion Of Access To Information Act, 2000’ available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/Manuals/LAPD-Gen-G06%20-
%20Manual%20on%20the%20Promotion%20of%20Access%20to%20Information%20Act%202000%20-
%20External%20Guide.pdf, accessed on 26 June 2015. 
109 WE Taggart and J Taggart ‘Whistleblower Office - What a Taxpayer Representative Must Know’ Journal of 
Tax Practice and Procedure available at http://www.heinonline.org.ezproxy.ukzn.ac.za: 
2048/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jtaxpp13&div=72&collection=journals&set_as_cursor=8&men_tab=s




 I submit that the application of a similar program within the South African context 
could affect many representative taxpayers that could be held liable in terms of section 155 of 
the TAA. They could come forward with company secrets that they were involved with. 
Considering the wide meaning of the term representative taxpayer there are many individuals 
that could find solace within such a program. Perhaps with the roll out of such a program in a 
situation where there is gross negligence or fraud resulting in tax evasion such as that in the 
Gore’s110 case could be avoided. In such a situation the representative taxpayer could avoid 
being held liable by striking a deal with the revenue authority in exchange 
 
6.6 Cowboy Behaviour will not be Accepted.   
In the recent case of Pretoria East Motors111 the court was faced with a situation where an 
official acting on behalf of the Commissioner, one Ms Victor had conducted an audit on the 
taxpayer.112 She had not properly acquainted herself with the taxpayers accounting system 
that was made available to her.113 Whenever she did not understand a discrepancy she raised 
an assessment against the taxpayer.114 I am of the view that this type of behaviour exhibited 
by the Commissioner’s official was that of a cowboy. The court noted that when the taxpayer 
had requested reasons for the assessments same could not be readily advanced as the official 
had relied on the taxpayer to disprove the assessments she raised.115 The court noted that the 
Commissioner is required to properly review and understand the documentation submitted by 
the taxpayer.116 The standard of proof that the taxpayer is required to discharge will be 
considered as a whole taking into account the ipse dixit of the taxpayer, documentary 
evidence as well as witness testimony.117  
 
                                                          
110 Ibid note 88. 
111 Ibid note 40.  
112 Ibid note 40 at para 7. 
113 Ibid note 40 at para 10. 
114 Ibid note 40 at para 11. 
115 Ibid note 40 at para 13. 
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 It is thus evident that the courts will not accept such cowboy type of behaviour from 
Commissioner’s representatives, and that when an assessment is raised there must be proper 
grounds for such. It is therefore comforting to those facing the wrath of section 155 of the 
TAA that the courts will ensure that there is no cowboy behaviour by any of the parties, 
especially the Commissioner’s representatives. This point raises the importance of laying the 
proper foundations and correctly assessing the facts of a case.  In this context we are alerted 
to the importance of introducing a generic process that may be followed before section 155 of 
the TAA can be invoked. If this generic process is introduced then sloppy work from the 
Commissioner’s representative can be detected before section 155 of the TAA is invoked and 
as such we can avoid undue time, effort and money from being spent.  
 
The issues that have been highlighted in the aforementioned text provide the foundations of 
the way forward and will be tied together in my concluding chapter. 
 
CHAPTER 7: A PRACTICAL APPROACH. 
In this chapter I will make a determination on whether a generic process or enquiry is 
required to add more clarity to section 155 of the TAA and the basic tenets of any such 
appropriate enquiry or process will be proposed before personal liability can be invoked by 
the Commissioner in terms of section 155 of the TAA.  
 
 The case on point in this regard is the unreported case of Peretz v CSARS118 where the 
court found that it is of grave importance that before the Commissioner can invoke the 
personal liability of a representative taxpayer a full and proper enquiry must conducted on the 
facts and it must be satisfied on a balance of probability that the requirements of personal 
liability have been met and can be supported by concrete evidence.  
 
 In the case of Peretz the applicant had sought to rescind a default judgment taken 
against him in his personal capacity for the outstanding taxes owed by Restomont Trading 
                                                          
118 Ibid note 2. 
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CC (‘Restomont’) of which he had been the sole member.119 The Commissioner held the 
applicant personally liable for Restomont’s outstanding taxes in terms of the erstwhile section 
48 (6) of the VAT Act120 which can be equated to section 155 of the TAA, in that it attributed 
personal liability to the representative vendor in specific circumstances. The court was faced 
with the issue of whether those specific circumstances had existed in the case to enable the 
Commissioner to hold the applicant personally liable.121 The Commissioner had analysed the 
bank statements of the CC and referred to specific periods in time where taxes were due and 
not paid.122 The bank statements showed that there had been sufficient funds available in 
Restomont’s bank account at those points, yet no payment was made for the taxes due.123 The 
applicant contended that one Mr Hyde had been responsible for the administration of the CC 
and he had since passed away at the end of February 2004.124 Consequently the applicant 
argued that they could not be held liable for any alienation or disposition before that time.125 
The court did not agree with this argument and held that Mr Hyde was at no point the 
representative taxpayer of the CC, and that the applicant was always the representative 
taxpayer of the CC and at all materials times controlled the CC.126  The court referred to the 
then section 48(6) of the VAT Act and found that the applicant became personally liable 
when the applicant had ‘disposed of the funds under his control instead of paying tax’.127   
  
Since the applicant had based his case on the contention that judgment was 
erroneously taken against him, instead of Restomont128 the court did not expand on the 
concept of personal liability. Since the court did not elaborate on the personal liability issue 
one may view this judgment as lacking in its statutory obligation to add clarity to the law. 
There were two important considerations which the judgment did raise. At the outset we note 
that the court did not entertain the defence that Mr Hyde was responsible for the failure to 
pay the outstanding taxes. The court was clear on its stance that the applicant was at all 
relevant times in control of the CC and could not pass liability for failing to pay taxes to 
                                                          
119 Ibid note 2 at para 1. 
120 Ibid note 2 at para 12. 
121 Ibid note 2 at para 16. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid note 2 at para 19. 
124 Ibid note 2 at para 17. 
125 Ibid note 2 at para 17. 
126 Ibid note 2 at para 18. 
127 Ibid note 2 at para 32. 
128 Ibid note 2 at para 31. 
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another.129 Secondly the Commissioner had conducted an analysis of the bank statement, 
versus the VAT returns, and managed to sustain the contention that the CC had funds 
available in its bank account at the time the VAT debt was due.130 However the applicant 
who had been in control of the bank account had failed to make payment of outstanding 
VAT.131 The court seemed to favour the systematic and objective approach of matching the 
bank statements with the specific points in time when the taxes were due and not paid. 
However it is concerning that the court did not address the issue of whether the funds were 
disposed of for essential services such as employees’ salaries and electricity. It therefore 
seems from the judgment that during such an enquiry to determine personal liability of a 
representative vendor all that needs to be proven is that funds were available and payment 
was not made.  
 
This approach appears to be due to the court’s finding that VAT is a self-assessment 
tax and therefore the responsibility to make payment does not arise from demand or 
assessment. Thus the very nature of the VAT system, in the words of the court, made vendors 
‘involuntary tax collectors’.132 On that basis is it then possible to argue that in the case of 
other taxes such as normal tax where the responsibility to pay arises from an assessment or 
demand that a consideration can be made for other payments which are necessary to be made.  
 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION. 
In this dissertation I have laid out the practice at present in respect of the application of 
section 155 of the TAA. The central issue that has been raised is the fact that there is no 
process that the Commissioner is obliged to adhere to before requesting reasons in terms of 
section 184 of the TAA from the representative taxpayer. This is the only process that the 
Commissioner must adhere to before he holds the representative taxpayer liable in terms of 
section 155 of the TAA. This is alarming because it raises the suspicion that this provision 
could be misused in an environment where there is a large volume of work to be done. An 
example of this is the behavior exhibited by the Commissioners representative in the Pretoria 
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132 Ibid note 2 at para 28.2. 
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East Motors133 case. This could thereby lead to undue hardship to unsuspecting representative 
taxpayers. The problem is compounded by the fact that section 155 of the TAA does not 
require judicial supervision to be invoked. This is in contrast to section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act 2008. This raises the suspicion that the provision does not have sufficient 
checks and balances to mitigate potential harm to representative taxpayers. 
  
It is submitted that the most practical solution to the problem is to develop section 155 
of the TAA further. This should be done in a manner that compels the Commissioner to 
adhere to a generic process of analysing the facts, in an objective manner, such as the process 
highlighted in the Peretz case.134 
   
A further practical solution to this issue is for the legislature to consider harmonising 
section 155 of the TAA with section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008. At present these two 
provisions can be invoked to hold a representative taxpayer personally liable for the 
taxpayer’s tax debt. However section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 requires a court of 
law to review the process of looking behind the corporate veil and holding the representative 
taxpayer personally liable. On the other hand section 155 of the TAA does not require this. It 
is therefore submitted that these two provisions should be harmonised in the sense that 
section 155 of the TAA must also be subject to review by a court of law.   
 
These two findings could well assist in bringing an equitable resolution to the 
potential troubles that section 155 of the TAA could create for an unsuspecting representative 
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